- (1) (Page 321, problem 2) Suppose p is a large prime,  $\alpha$  is a primitive root, and  $\beta \equiv \alpha^a \pmod{p}$ . The numbers  $p, \alpha, \beta$  are public. Peggy wants to prove to Victor that she knows a without revealing it. They do the following.
  - (a) Peggy chooses a random number  $r \pmod{p-1}$ .
  - (b) Peggy computes  $h_1 \equiv \alpha^r \pmod{p}$  and  $h_2 \equiv \alpha^{a-r} \pmod{p}$  and sends  $h_1, h_2$  to Victor.
  - (c) Victor chooses i = 1 or i = 2 and asks Peggy to send either  $r_1 = r$  or  $r_2 = a r \pmod{p-1}$ .
  - (d) Victor checks that  $h_1h_2 \equiv \beta \pmod{p}$  and that  $h_i \equiv \alpha^{r_i} \pmod{p}$ .
  - They repeat this procedure t times, for some specified t.
  - (a) Suppose Peggy does not know a. Why will she usually be unable to produce numbers that convince Victor?
  - (b) If Peggy does not know a, what is the probability that Peggy can convince Victor that she knows a?
  - (c) Suppose Nelson tries a variant. He wants to convince Victor that he knows a, so he chooses a random r as before, but does not send  $h_1, h_2$ . Victor asks for  $r_i$  and Nelson sends it. They do this several times. Why is Victor not convinced of anything? What is the essential difference between Nelson's scheme and Peggy's scheme that causes this?
- (2) (Page 322, problem 3) Nelson thinks he understands zero-knowledge protocols. He wants to prove to Victor that he knows that factorization of n (which equals pq for two large primes p and q) without revealing this factorization to Victor or anyone else. Nelson devises the following procedure: Victor chooses a random  $x \pmod{n}$ , computes  $y \equiv x^2 \pmod{n}$ , and sends y to Nelson. Nelson computes a square root s of  $y \pmod{n}$  and sends s to Victor. Victor checks that  $s^2 \equiv y \pmod{n}$ . Victor repeats this 20 times.
  - (a) Describe how Nelson computes s, assuming  $p \equiv q \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$ .
  - (b) Explain how Victor can use this procedure to have a high probability of factoring n. (Therefore, this is not a zero-knowledge protocol.)
  - (c) Suppose Eve is eavesdropping and hears the values of each y and s. Is it likely that she obtains any useful information, if no value of y repeats?
- (3) (Page 323, problem 5) Peggy claims to know an RSA plaintext; n, e, c are public and she claims to know m with  $m^e \equiv c \pmod{n}$ . She wants to prove this to Victor using a zero knowledge protocol. They perform the following steps.
  - (a) Peggy chooses a random integer  $r_1$  and computes  $r_2 \equiv m \cdot r_1^{-1} \pmod{n}$ .
  - (b) Peggy computes  $x_1 \equiv r_1^e \pmod{n}$  and  $x_2 \equiv r_2^e \pmod{n}$  and sends  $x_1, x_2$  to Victor.
  - (c) Victor checks that  $x_1x_2 \equiv c \pmod{n}$ .

Give the remaining steps of the protocol. Victor should be at least 99% convinced that Peggy is not lying.