Homework 31, due November 18
(1) (Page 321, problem 2) Suppose $p$ is a large prime, $\alpha$ is a primitive root, and $\beta \equiv \alpha^{a}(\bmod p)$. The numbers $p, \alpha, \beta$ are public. Peggy wants to prove to Victor that she knows $a$ without revealing it. They do the following.
(a) Peggy chooses a random number $r(\bmod p-1)$.
(b) Peggy computes $h_{1} \equiv \alpha^{r}(\bmod p)$ and $h_{2} \equiv \alpha^{a-r}(\bmod p)$ and sends $h_{1}, h_{2}$ to Victor.
(c) Victor chooses $i=1$ or $i=2$ and asks Peggy to send either $r_{1}=r$ or $r_{2}=a-r$ $(\bmod p-1)$.
(d) Victor checks that $h_{1} h_{2} \equiv \beta(\bmod p)$ and that $h_{i} \equiv \alpha^{r_{i}}(\bmod p)$.

They repeat this procedure $t$ times, for some specified $t$.
(a) Suppose Peggy does not know $a$. Why will she usually be unable to produce numbers that convince Victor?
(b) If Peggy does not know $a$, what is the probability that Peggy can convince Victor that she knows $a$ ?
(c) Suppose Nelson tries a variant. He wants to convince Victor that he knows $a$, so he chooses a random $r$ as before, but does not send $h_{1}, h_{2}$. Victor asks for $r_{i}$ and Nelson sends it. They do this several times. Why is Victor not convinced of anything? What is the essential difference between Nelson's scheme and Peggy's scheme that causes this?
(2) (Page 322, problem 3) Nelson thinks he understands zero-knowledge protocols. He wants to prove to Victor that he knows that factorization of $n$ (which equals $p q$ for two large primes $p$ and $q$ ) without revealing this factorization to Victor or anyone else. Nelson devises the following procedure: Victor chooses a random $x(\bmod n)$, computes $y \equiv x^{2}(\bmod n)$, and sends $y$ to Nelson. Nelson computes a square root $s$ of $y(\bmod n)$ and sends $s$ to Victor. Victor checks that $s^{2} \equiv y(\bmod n)$. Victor repeats this 20 times.
(a) Describe how Nelson computes $s$, assuming $p \equiv q \equiv 3(\bmod 4)$.
(b) Explain how Victor can use this procedure to have a high probability of factoring $n$. (Therefore, this is not a zero-knowledge protocol.)
(c) Suppose Eve is eavesdropping and hears the values of each $y$ and $s$. Is it likely that she obtains any useful information, if no value of $y$ repeats?
(3) (Page 323, problem 5) Peggy claims to know an RSA plaintext; $n, e, c$ are public and she claims to know $m$ with $m^{e} \equiv c(\bmod n)$. She wants to prove this to Victor using a zero knowledge protocol. They perform the following steps.
(a) Peggy chooses a random integer $r_{1}$ and computes $r_{2} \equiv m \cdot r_{1}^{-1}(\bmod n)$.
(b) Peggy computes $x_{1} \equiv r_{1}^{e}(\bmod n)$ and $x_{2} \equiv r_{2}^{e}(\bmod n)$ and sends $x_{1}, x_{2}$ to Victor.
(c) Victor checks that $x_{1} x_{2} \equiv c(\bmod n)$.

Give the remaining steps of the protocol. Victor should be at least $99 \%$ convinced that Peggy is not lying.

